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NOTES
PRICE WATERHOUSE v. HOPKINS:
ATTEMPTING TO RESOLVE THE
MIXED-MOTIVE DILEMMA
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")1 was
enacted "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and re-
move barriers that ha[d] operated in the past to favor an identifi-
able group of white employees over other employees." 2 More sim-
ply, Title VII was designed to deter employers from discriminatory
conduct s and "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on ac-
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). Title VII is only one part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964; the other components are: Title I, Voting Rights, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973ff-6 (1988);
Title II, Public Accommodations, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1988); Title III, Public Facili-
ties, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b-2000b-3 (1988); Title IV, Public Education, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c-
200c-9 (1988); Title V, Civil Rights Commission, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1975d (1988); Title VI,
Federally Assisted Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4a (1988); and Title VIII, Registra-
tion and Voting Statistics, 42 U.S.C. § 2000f (1988).
2 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); see McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (Title VII enacted "to assure equality of employment
opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fos-
tered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens"); see also
Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of
Equality and Weber, 59 N.C.L. REv. 531, 538 (1981) ("primary purpose of Title VII was to
improve the economic status of blacks as a group") (footnote omitted); Chamallas, Evolving
Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the
Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REv. 305, 306 (1983) (Title VII enacted "to improve the
lot of traditionally victimized minorities"). For a comprehensive treatment of the legislative
history of Title VII, see Blunrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 22 RUTGERS L. REv. 465 (1968) and Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C.
INDUS. & Cor. L. REv. 431 (1966).
See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); Bibbs v. Block, 778
F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Title VII prohibits all racial prejudice in employ-
ment settings); see also Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 318 (1982) ("[Title VIII has
also been read to provide the plaintiff with an enforceable right to have decisions regarding
him made without regard to any of the forbidden criteria").
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count of unlawful employment discrimination." 4 To achieve this
result, section 703(a) of Title VII prohibits an employer from dis-
criminating against an employee with regard to hiring, firing, com-
pensation, or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, "be-
cause of" that employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Section 706(g) of the Act deals with the remedies available
for violations under section 703(a).6
Title VII aims to eradicate two major types of employment
discrimination: "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact."'7
Disparate treatment, the more obvious form,' involves intentional
Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418; see Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977) (employee not awarded windfall unless discrimination
controlled employer's decision); Haskins v. United States Dep't of the Army, 808 F.2d 1192,
1200 (6th Cir. 1987) ("Title VII does not require federal courts to grant plaintiff a windfall,
but only requires an award of 'make whole' relief"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987); Bibbs,
778 F.2d at 1322 ("[u]nless the impermissible ... motivation was a but-for cause[,] ... to
place [the employee] in the job would . . .award him a windfall"); see also 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1988) (provision for statutory relief).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Title VII provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
It is important to note, however, that a statutory exception, known as the bona fide
occupational qualification ("BFOQ"), exists for certain employment practices. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(e) (1988). The BFOQ provision allows an employer to hire individuals on the basis
of religion, sex or national origin if it is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise." Id. It is self-evident that this exception does not
include race or color. Id. Thus, no racially-motivated discrimination can be justified under
this provision. Also, even when the BFOQ exception may apply, courts consistently have
interpreted it narrowly. Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Mitchell v. Board of Trustees of Pickens County School
Dist. "A", 415 F. Supp. 512, 518 (D.S.C. 1976); see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334-
35 (1977).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
" See Note, Applying Disparate Impact Theory to Subjective Employee Selection Pro-
cedures, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 375, 389 (1987).
' See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
"[D]isparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted
Title VII." Id. Senator Humphrey, summarizing his view on Title VII, stated: "What the
bill does [is] ... to make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment.
It provides that men and women shall be employed on the basis of their qualifications." 110
CONG. REc. 13,088 (1964).
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discrimination against an individual because of one's race, color,
religion, gender, or national origin.9 In such a case, proof of dis-
criminatory intent is essential.' 0 In contrast, disparate impact
deals with facially neutral employment practices, such as height
and weight 1 or education requirements,'12 which have a dispropor-
tionate effect upon members of an identifiable class.'"
' See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. Senator Clark, in debates concerning Title VII,
defined "to discriminate" as follows:
[T]o make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those
distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are prohibited by [Title
VII] are those which are based on any five of the forbidden criteria: race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin. Any other criterion or qualification for employ-
ment is not affected by this title.
110 CONG. REC. 7,213 (1964).
10 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. Disparate treatment cases are more difficult to
prove than disparate impact cases because they require a showing of discriminatory motive.
See Note, supra note 7. Disparate impact cases do not require such a showing. Teamsters,
431 U.S. at 336 n.15.
11 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 321 (1977) (statutory height and weight
requirements discriminately operated to bar employment of women).
,2 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 424 (1971) (high school education and
aptitude test used to bar transfer or hiring). The employment practices which typically re-
sult in disparate impact are those which the employer uses to screen employees in an at-
tempt to predict the future quality of their work. See Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory
Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title
VII, 56 TEx L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1977).
Is See Belton, supra note 2, at 542. The evidentiary model applied in disparate impact
cases was developed in Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436, a case in which the Court first focused its
attention on the consequences of an employer's practices, rather than merely the employer's
intent. Id. at 432. Under this model, a disparate impact employee bears the initial burden of
proving that, although the disputed employment policy is neutral on its face and applies
equally to all persons, it has a discriminatory impact on members of the employee's pro-
tected class. See Belton, supra note 2, at 546-47. An employee need not prove actual dis-
criminatory intent as a prerequisite to a finding of unlawful discrimination. International
Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977); see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
Once discriminatory impact has been established, the burden shifts to the employer to
show that the questioned employment practice is justified by "business necessity." Id. at
431-32. To meet this burden, the employer need only show a legitimate business purpose.
See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-27 (1989); Comment, The
Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 911, 933 (1979) ("[t]he higher standard of business necessity . . . is fundamentally
inconsistent with the equal-treatment rationale of [Title VII]").
Should the employer meet its burden, the employee is then given an opportunity to
show that the employment practice is a pretext for discrimination and that alternative, non-
discriminatory practices exist by which the employer's purported business needs could be
met. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
Recently, the disparate impact analysis has been applied to subjective employment prac-
tices. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(disparate impact equally applicable to objective and subjective employment practices). See
generally Note, supra note 7, at 399-410 (discussing importance of subjective employment
1990]
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Disparate treatment claims can be divided into two broad cat-
egories: "single-motive" and "mixed-motive."' 4 In the single-mo-
tive situation, the challenged employment decision is the result of
exclusive reliance by the employer on either a legitimate factor
(such as the employee's insubordination) or an illegitimate, dis-
criminatory factor (such as the employee's race).15 Mixed-motive
cases, on the other hand, are more complex and involve employ-
ment-related decisions which are motivated by both legitimate and
illegitimate factors. 16
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 7 and its progeny,'8 the
United States Supreme Court established an evidentiary frame-
work to allocate the burdens of proof and to determine the stan-
dard of proof in single-motive cases. 9 Under this framework, the
Court has determined that the burden of persuasion should remain
at all times upon the employee.20 The lower courts have been uni-
procedures in disparate impact).
This Note focuses exclusively on disparate treatment actions. For a more comprehen-
sive analysis of disparate impact, see generally Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2115, and Blum-
rosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment
Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
"' See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (distinguishing
mixed-motive from single-motive cases).
15 See id. at 1320. Typically, the employee claims discrimination, while the employer
asserts that it had a legitimate reason for its action. Id. at 1320-21. The court must then
determine the true reason to be one or the other, not both. Id.; see Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1789 (1989) ("either a legitimate or an illegitimate
set of considerations led to the challenged decision"); NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt.
Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 (1983) ("illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the 'true'
motives behind the decision").
"' See Brodin, supra note 3, at 293 ("employer seems in fact to have been motivated by
both lawful and unlawful considerations"); Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex
Problems: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under
Title VII, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 353, 374 (1984) (employer "was at least acting out of two (or
more) motives, one of which was illegal"); Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination,
Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFFALO L. REv. 85,
113 (1986) ("several reasons [exist] for [the employer's] action, only one of which is
unlawful").
17 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
'8 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-60 (1981) (clari-
fying McDonnell Douglas framework); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 24-25
(1978) (same); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-81 (1978) (same).
'9 See Note, Indirect Proof of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treat-
ment Claims After Aikens, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1114, 1116-18 (1988). McDonnell Douglas
was the first step in the development of the evidentiary framework used in single-motive
cases. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05; see also infra notes 26-53 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing burdens of proof in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny).
20 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-05, 807.
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form in applying this principle. 1 In deciding mixed-motive cases,
however, the lower courts were without the guidance of an eviden-
tiary model because the Court had never addressed directly the
issue in a Title VII context.2 Recently, in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,23 the United States Supreme Court examined a mixed-
motive case and expressly rejected the applicability of the McDon-
nell Douglas framework. 4 Instead, the Court determined that for
mixed-motive cases the initial burden would rest on the employee
to show the existence of discrimination in the decision-making pro-
cess, but once established, the burden would shift to the employer
to persuade the court that the same decision would have been
reached regardless of any discriminatory factors.2
This Note will discuss the Court's decision in Price
Waterhouse. Part I will examine the framework established by the
Court for single-motive disparate treatment cases to provide a
background for the analysis to follow. Part II will describe the va-
rious approaches taken by courts in deciding non-Title VII mixed-
motive cases and address the lack of uniformity among the lower
federal courts in the context of Title VII mixed-motive cases. Part
Ill will provide a synopsis of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Price Waterhouse. Finally, Part IV will analyze this decision and
will suggest that the Court was correct in determining that the sin-
gle-motive evidentiary model was inapplicable to the mixed-motive
context.
I. SINGLE-MOTIVE DISPARATE TREATMENT
Since direct evidence of unlawful discriminatory intent is
21 See, e.g., Woodbury v. New York City Transit Auth., 832 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1987)
(recognizing appropriateness of McDonnell Douglas framework); Becton v. Detroit Terminal
of Consol. Freightways, 687 F.2d 140, 141 (6th Cir. 1982) (same), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040
(1983); Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109, 116-17 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 985 (1981).
22 See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("[t]he Supreme
Court has not expressly addressed the mixed-motives problem in a Title VII case, but it has
focused on it in other contexts"); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 709 (6th Cir.
1985) ("[t]he Court ... has not expressly explained causation requirements in a Title VII
dual motive case"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989); Brodin, supra note 3, at 299 ("lower
courts have had a relatively free hand to fashion their own differing standards").
23 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
2, See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1785-86. For an overview of the evidentiary
model set forth in Price Waterhouse, see infra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.
10 See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1788.
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rarely available,26 a plaintiff in a single-motive disparate treatment
case27 is generally compelled to rely on indirect or circumstantial
evidence 28 to prove intentional discrimination.29 Thus, in an effort
to help "capture all the instances of discrimination at which Con-
gress took aim when it enacted Title VII,"30 the Supreme Court, in
McDonnell Douglas,31 developed a three-stage analytical frame-
work to afford "single-motive" plaintiffs an opportunity to prove
intentional discrimination using circumstantial evidence.3 2
The first stage of this analysis requires the plaintiff-employee
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of
employment discrimination.3 The employee may satisfy this bur-
den by showing:
26 See Edwards, Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent and the Burden of Proof:
An Analysis and Critique, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 16 & n.116 (1986).
27 As a general matter, single-motive disparate treatment claims can be divided into
three categories: (1) individual treatment claims, which are governed by the formula estab-
lished in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); (2) private class action disparate treatment
cases, such as Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); and (3) "pattern or
practice" treatment claims brought by the government, which are governed by Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), and International Bd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). See Furnish, supra note 16, at 354 n.9.
The class action and pattern or practice cases are beyond the scope of this Note, which
focuses exclusively on individual disparate treatment cases.
2 Many commentators have come to use the terms "indirect" evidence and "circum-
stantial" evidence interchangeably. See, e.g., 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 24, at 396 (3d ed.
1940); A. WILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 27 (1982); W. WILLS,
AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 16 (5th ed. 1981).
Circumstantial evidence has been defined as "direct evidence of a minor fact or facts,
incidental to or usually connected with some other fact as its accident, and from which such
other fact is therefore inferred." W. WILLS, supra, at 16-17; see C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 543 (3d ed. 1984) ("even if the circumstances depicted are accppted as
true, additional reasoning is required to reach the proposition to which it is directed").
29 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
("[t]here will seldom be 'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes");
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (requirement of direct evidence rather
than circumstantial evidence would put "insurmountable" burden on victims of discrimina-
tion); Furnish, supra note 16, at 356 (discussing lack of direct evidence of disparate treat-
ment in employment setting); cf. Thornbrough v. Columbus & G.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638
(5th Cir. 1985) ("ADEA" claim) ("[u]nless the employer is a latter-day George Washington,
employment discrimination is as difficult to prove as who chopped down the cherry tree").
30 Note, supra note 19, at 1133; see supra note 5 (text of Title VII).
21 McDonnell Douglas was the first case in which the Supreme Court specifically ad-
dressed the "order and allocation of proof in a private,.non-class action challenging employ-
ment discrimination." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 800.
22 Id. at 802-05.
22 See id. at 802; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981).
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(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek appli-
cants from persons of complainant's qualifications."
The employee may satisfy this first stage by establishing that her
"rejection did not result from the two most common legitimate
reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job applicant:
an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a
vacancy in the job sought. 3 5
This formula is not limited to cases alleging wrongful failure
to hire, as was the situation in McDonnell Douglas; it has been
adapted by the courts to analyze discriminatory employment deci-
sions concerning "discharge, discipline, layoff, promotion, transfer,
retaliation, denial of training, and compensation."36 In addition,
the Court did not preclude the use of other methods to establish-
ing discriminatory intent.3 7
UMcDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The employee is not required to prove that the
position at issue was filled by an individual other than a member of his protected class. See
Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985); Diaz v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, the employee will not be
prevented from establishing a prima facie case if, after she has instituted the action, the
position is filled by a member of the same protected class. See id. at 1360-61. However, a
different position was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Lee v. Russell County Bd. of
Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 1982). The Lee court construed McDonnell Douglas as
requiring the employee to prove that she "was discharged and replaced by a person outside
of the protected class or was discharged while a person outside of the class with equal or
lesser qualifications was retained." Id.
"I International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977). The
Teamsters Court stated that "[elfimination of these reasons for the refusal to hire is suffi-
cient, absent other explanation, to create an inference that the decision was a discriminatory
one." Id.
11 Note, supra note 19, at 1117 n.19. For a list of such cases, see 2 A. LARSON & L.
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 50.22 (1990).
17 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).
In Aikens, the Court stated: "The prima facie case method established in McDonnell Doug-
las was 'never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible,
orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the criti-
cal question of discrimination.'" Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. V. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1981)).
The non-exhaustive nature of the McDonnell Douglas framework is evident in pattern-
or-practice claims in which employees typically introduce statistical evidence to establish a
claim of disparate treatment against a class of persons protected under Title VII. Smith,
Employer Defenses in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burdens
of Proof and Substantive Standards Following Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2:289
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,8 the
Court found that the "establishment of [a] prima facie case in ef-
fect creates a [rebuttable] presumption that the employer unlaw-
fully discriminated against the employee. '3 9 The Court's recogni-
tion of the difficulty in proving discrimination without direct
evidence, the employer's greater access to such evidence, and the
fact that the employer's actions, unless otherwise explained, "are
more likely than not" the result of discriminatory considerations,
support this presumption of discrimination."
The creation of the rebuttable presumption in a single-motive
case, however, has only a limited effect upon the employer.4' Once
established, the case proceeds to the second stage, in which the
burden of production shifts "to the employer to articulate some
Burdine, 55 TEMP. L.Q. 372, 380 (1982). However, such evidence is admissible only if it is
relevant and will "be deemed to constitute a prima facie case" only if it is "sufficiently
rigorous." Id. at 380-81.
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
" Id. at 254. The Burdine Court noted that "the prima facie case 'raises an inference of
discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely
than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.'" Id. (quoting Furnco, 438
U.S. at 577). Although the Burdine Court described the McDonnell Douglas factors as
"giv[ing] rise to an inference," id. at 253, it later explained that by "[t]he phrase 'prima
facie case,'" it meant only "the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presump-
tion," not the "plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the [court] to infer
the fact at issue." Id. at 254 n.7.
40 Id. at 254 (quoting Furnco, 438 U.S. at 577); see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, §
343, at 968-69 ("some presumptions are created to correct an imbalance resulting from one
party's superior access to proof"); Note, supra note 19, at 1117 (presumption created to help
"compensate[] for the [employer's] greater access to evidence").
41 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. It is not necessary for the employer to "persuade the court
that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons." Id. The burden of persuasion re-
mains at all times upon the employee. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, § 344, at 980
(prevailing view that presumption fixes burden of persuasion).
It has been suggested that courts look to Federal Rule of Evidence 301 for guidance
regarding the effect of presumptions in disparate treatment cases. See Mendez, Presump-
tions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN. L. REv.
1129, 1157-62 (1980). Rule 301 states:
[A] presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift
to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the .trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EvID. 301 (emphasis added).
However, there are exceptions to the general rule that a presumption shifts only the
burden of production to the opposing party. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, § 344, at 981
(some presumptions viewed as shifting burden of persuasion). Also, the burden of persua-
sion may rest with the employer at the relief stage of the proceeding, as opposed to the
liability stage, to show that intentional discrimination was not the "but for" cause of the
employment decision. See Smith, supra note 37, at 379 n.45.
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejec-
tion." 2 As clarified by the Court in Burdine, it is only the burden
of production, and not the burden of persuasion, which shifts to
the employer.43 Therefore, the employer need not convince the
court by a preponderance of the evidence that it did not discrimi-
nate against the plaintiff,44 but only need introduce sufficient evi-
dence to rebut the presumption.45 If the employer fails to meet this
burden, the employee will prevail.46
Should the employer rebut the presumption with evidence of a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its decision, the presump-
tion will disappear. 4 The case will then advance to the third stage,
42 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The employer need only show that the adverse
employment decision was based "on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one
such as race." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
Because McDonnell Douglas failed to determine the extent of the employer's burden,
lower courts have disagreed on whether the employer's burden, after the employee estab-
lished a prima facie case, is simply to produce some credible evidence of a nondiscrimina-
tory motive or to persuade the trier of fact. Compare Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d
1150, 1154-55 (2d Cir.) (employer must provide some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for rejection) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984
(1978), with Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977) (em-
ployer bears burden of proving legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for action by prepon-
derance of evidence, therefore bearing risk of nonpersuasion) and East v. Romine, Inc., 518
F.2d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 1975) (employer must come forward with comparable factual data).
See generally Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1979) (discussing split in
lower courts after McDonnell Douglas regarding nature of employer's burden); Mendez,
supra note 41, at 1135-38 (same).
4' See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56.
" See id. at 253.
45 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983)
(quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55). The employer must articulate its legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason through the introduction of admissible evidence at trial which is clear
and reasonably specific. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03. For example, simply
filing an answer to the employee's complaint will not satisfy the employer's burden. See
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.9.
However, the employer's reasons do not have to rise to the level of business necessity to
be considered legitimate. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-04. An employer's reason
may be legitimate even in the absence of a close relationship with job performance. See id.
(failure to rehire employee as result of illegal protest against employer found to be legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason).
46 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. A presumption is mandatory and, until rebutted, com-
pels a finding for the party aided by the presumption. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, §
346, at 988; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 2483.
47 See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715. After the employer presents "evidence of the reason for
the plaintiff's rejection ... the McDonnell-Burdine presumption 'drops from the case,' ...
and 'the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.'" Id. (quoting Burdine, 450
U.S. at 255); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, § 344, at 974 (if employer produces
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at which the employee is given an opportunity to demonstrate that
the employer's stated reasons were mere pretext for intentional
discrimination.48 It is at this stage that the employee's burden of
proving pretext "merges with the ultimate burden of persuading
the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimina-
tion. ' 49 The employee may discredit the employer's evidence of le-
gitimate considerations either directly by "persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-
ployer, ' 5° or indirectly by proving that the employer's alleged rea-
sons are not credible.51 Typically, the employee will rely on some
circumstantial evidence regardless of whether she is attempting to
prove pretext "directly" or "indirectly. ' 52 The court must then de-
cide whose explanation of motive is more credible.5 3 If the em-
sufficient evidence, "presumption is spent and disappears"); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 28,
§§ 2489-2490.
" See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716 n.5; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; see also Bibbs
v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("pretext" means "a reason for the
employment decision that is not the true reason"). The Supreme Court has further deter-
mined that the employee must meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
49Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. It is relatively easy for an employee to establish a prima
facie case and for the employer to explain its conduct; thus, "most disparate treatment
cases hinge upon this third stage of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry." Note, supra note 19,
at 1118; see B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1317 (2d ed. 1983)
("majority of disparate treatment cases.., depend on the issue of pretext"); Furnish, supra
note 16, at 357 (success or failure in disparate treatment cases is contingent upon pretext
issue).
50 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05). See gener-
ally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 1313-22 (discussing employee's proof of
employer's "pretext").
51 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05). An
employee can prove falsity by showing that the employer's reasons have no basis in fact, did
not actually motivate the employer's conduct, or were insufficient to have motivated it. See
Note, supra note 19, at 1121. However, "if the [employer] lies in rebuttal to conceal a rea-
son that is unseemly but legally permissible[,] . . .proof that the [employer's] proffered
explanation is false does not necessarily amount to proof of discriminatory intent." Id. at
1115.
52 See Note, supra note 19, at 1118 n.34; see also Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814
F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir.) (employee need not attack employer's articulated reason by means of
direct evidence), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (court "may not require direct evidence of intentional discrimination as
opposed to indirect [or circumstantial] evidence").
53 See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
The court must evaluate all of the evidence presented by the employee in establishing a
prima facie case and in attempting to prove pretext in deciding whether the employer has
violated Title VII. See Jones v. Western Geophysical Co., 761 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir.
1985) (all evidence examined by court below to ascertain racial motivation behind plaintiffs
discharge).
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ployee successfully refutes the employer's articulated reasons, she
will also establish the required causal connection between the em-
ployer's discriminatory motive and the resulting employment deci-
sion necessary for a Title VII violation. 4
II. MIXED-MOTIVE DISPARATE TREATMENT
As distinguished from single-motive cases, mixed-motive dis-
parate treatment arises when an employer is influenced by both
lawful and unlawful factors.8 5 "[D]iscrimination need not be the
sole reason for an adverse job decision,"5 but some causal connec-
tion between the discriminatory motive and the adverse employ-
ment decision is required. 57 The central issue in a mixed-motive
case, therefore, turns on the degree to which the employer's dis-
criminatory motivation caused the employment decision in
dispute.5 8
Because the Supreme Court had not directly addressed the al-
location of burdens and standard of proof required in a Title VII
See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("[t]he very show-
ing that the [employer's] asserted reason was a pretext for race is also a demonstration that
but for his race plaintiff would have gotten the job"); see also Note, supra note 19, at 1121
(disproving employer's stated reason entitles employee to win suit); Note, An Evaluation of
the Proper Standard of Causation in the Dual Motive Title VII Context: A Rejection of
the "Same Decision" Standard, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 209, 213 (1985-86) (causal connection
between discrimination and employer's conduct is sole explanation after proof of prima fa-
cie discrimination and refutation of employer's reasons) [hereinafter Proper Standard].
Although the court's determination of whether legitimate or discriminatory reasons mo-
tivated the employer is "both sensitive and difficult," Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716, it is treated
as a finding of fact and is overturned only if the trial court's determination was "clearly
erroneous." See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); see also FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("[flindings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous")
(emphasis added).
55 See Note, Clearing the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 87 MICH. L. REv. 863 (1989).
[Ain employment action based on several permissible motives or several imper-
missible ones - say, an employer discharging an employee because of absenteeism
and poor performance, or because of race and religion - still acts with "single"
motives. The key to the distinction between "single" and "mixed" motives lies in
the combination of impermissible motive(s) with permissible one(s).
Id. at 864 n.8.
" Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987); see Price Waterhouse, 109 S.
Ct. at 1785 n.7 ("Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would have placed the
word 'solely' in front of the words 'because of'" in section 703(a)(1)) (citing 110 CONG. REC.
2728, 13,837 (1964)); Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1980) ("for-
bidden taint" must be at least "significant factor").
See Fields, 817 F.2d at 935.
8 See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 49, at 560-61.
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mixed-motive case until Price Waterhouse,5 it is asserted that
questions regarding these issues will likely proliferate in the lower
courts. However, the Court had previously developed a procedural
framework for analyzing mixed-motive discrimination actions in a
first amendment context."
In Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,6 the Court formulated a test whereby the employee would
bear the initial burden of proving that his constitutionally-pro-
tected conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the
employer's adverse employment decision.62 Once demonstrated,
the burden of proof would shift to the employer to demonstrate
"by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached
the same decision ... in the absence of the protected conduct."6' 3
This "same decision" test has been extended by the Court to cases
involving alleged violations of the equal protection clause 4 and la-
bor disputes under the National Labor Relations Act. 5
The Mount Healthy decision, however, did not effectively re-
solve the lower courts' confusion as to the proper allocation of bur-
dens and the standard of proof required in a Title VII mixed-mo-
tive action.6 Disagreement persisted as to the standard of proof
Proper Standard, supra note 54, at 210.
80 See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87
(1977) (causation test to distinguish between results caused by constitutional and non-con-
stitutional violations formulated).
61 Id.
62 See id. at 287.
63 Id.
See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270
(1977). The Court in Arlington Heights stated that "[p]roof that the decision by the Village
was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would ... have shifted to the
Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted" even in the
absence of the discriminatory consideration. Id. at 270-71 n.21. Ultimately, the Court did
not find the case to be one of mixed motives because the plaintiffs did not successfully prove
that discrimination had motivated the employer. Id. at 270.
Likewise, in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), where it was alleged that a
state constitutional provision discriminated against blacks, the Court acknowledged the ap-
plicability of the framework established in Mount Healthy and Arlington Heights for ana-
lyzing mixed-motive discrimination cases. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232. However, the Court
did not apply the mixed-motive analysis because it found the plaintiff's evidence of race
discrimination so compelling as to make the "but-for" determination "beyond peradven-
ture." Id.
65 See NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) (analogy to
Mount Healthy is fair); see also NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 906 (1st Cir. 1981)
("critical difference" between Mount Healthy and labor cases does "not affect the substan-
tive utility of the 'but for' analysis"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
66 See Note, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: The Eighth Circuit's Treatment
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required to establish a causal connection between the discrimina-
tory factor and the resulting adverse employment decision. 7 Some
courts have required that the employee establish "but for" causa-
tion, 8 wherein the burden of persuasion would remain upon the
employee. 9 Other courts, however, have adopted the standard set
out in Mount Healthy, which requires only that the employee
show that the discriminatory factor was a "motivating" or "sub-
stantial" consideration. ° In addition, following the "same deci-
of Dual Motive Cases-Bibbs v. Block, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 941, 964 (1986) ("[i]t is evi-
dent that the lower federal courts have not wholly accepted the use of the Mount Healthy
approach for determining whether a violation of Title VII has occurred"); supra note 22 and
accompanying text (noting lower courts' confusion because Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed mixed-motive problem in Title VII actions). Some commentators have asserted that
although the Mount Healthy framework may be appropriate in cases of constitutional viola-
tions, it is inapplicable in Title VII cases. See Brodin, supra note 3, at 311 n.82; Edwards,
supra note 26, at 23.
'7 See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
Is See McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987)
("but for" causation "well settled in this circuit"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 914 (1988); Mack v.
Cape Elizabeth School Bd., 553 F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977) (plaintiff has ultimate burden
of showing impermissible factors were determinative); Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 924
(3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff would have been promoted "but for" unlawful discrimination); see
also Edwards, supra note 26, at 34 (employee must prove discrimination was determinative
factor by showing adverse decision would not have been reached "but for" employer's mo-
tive); cf. Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985) (ADEA violation)
(plaintiff must show "but for" age he would have been retained). But see Toney v. Block,
705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Toney, requiring the employee to prove a hypothet-
ical "but for" situation was found to be unreasonable and contrary to the goals of Title VII.
Id. For a view that the "but for" causation test is inadequate because it still permits the
employer to discriminate unlawfully, see Stonefield, Non-Determinative Discrimination,
Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary of Discrimination Law, 35 BUFFALO L. REv. 85
(1986).
1 See, e.g., McQuillen, 830 F.2d at 666 ("[i]n a disparate treatment case, the burden of
persuasion on the issue of discrimination rests with the plaintiff at all times") (citing Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)).
70 See, e.g., Berl v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1988) (employer
failed to meet burden under second prong of Mount Healthy); Fields v. Clark Univ., 817
F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987) (direct proof that unlawful discrimination was "motivating
factor" in employment decision shifts burden to employer); Fadhl v. City & County of San
Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that gender was "significant factor"
in employment decision justifies imposition of initial liability).
The view that an employee may meet her burden even where the discriminatory factor
was less than "motivating" or "substantial" is also supported. See, e.g., Blalock v. Metals
Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff must "demonstrate by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the employer's decision to take an adverse employment action was
more likely than not motivated by a criterion proscribed by the statute") (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989); Gillin v. Federal Paper Bd. Co., 479 F.2d 97, 102 (2d
Cir. 1973) (superior qualifications of successful male candidate did not negate discrimina-
tion against female candidate); King v. Laborers Int'l Union Local No. 818, 443 F.2d 273,
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sion" test of Mount Healthy, these courts shifted the burden of
persuasion to the employer 7 1 to prove that, even had the discrimi-
natory factor not been considered, the same decision would have
been reached. 2 Yet, even courts adhering to the "same decision"
standard have disagreed about the standard of proof required for
the employer to satisfy its burden. 3 Some courts have held the
employer to a preponderance standard, 4 while others have applied
the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. 5
The courts that followed Mount Healthy further disagreed as
to the effect that the "same decision" analysis would have on the
parties.76 Some determined that, upon a finding that the same de-
cision would have been reached regardless of discrimination, the
employer would be absolved of liability.7 7 However, other courts
279 (6th Cir. 1971) (employee entitled to lost compensation when discrimination was "in
part, a causal factor") (emphasis added); see also Proper Standard, supra note 54, at 220
("more likely than not" requirement is "less onerous than the 'substantial factor' require-
ment, yet it retains respect for the employer's interest").
71 See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("the burden of
production and persuasion shift[] from the plaintiff to the [employer]"); Blalock, 775 F.2d
at 712 (burden of proof that adverse employment action would have occurred without dis-
crimination shifted to employer).
72 Blalock, 775 F.2d at 711 (employer cannot offer nondiscriminatory reasons to rebut
direct evidence of discrimination); see Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557
(11th Cir. 1983) ("[employer] cannot refute this evidence by mere articulation of other rea-
sons"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984).
71 See Brodin, supra note 3, at 299 ("the Supreme Court has ... provided little guid-
ance on the problem of mixed-motive causation in non-class actions... [thus,] lower courts
have had a relatively free hand to fashion their own differing standards").
74 See, e.g., Fields, 817 F.2d at 937 (burden on employer is by preponderance of evi-
dence); Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1324 (same); Blalock, 775 F.2d at 712 (same). See generally 2 A.
LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 36, § 50.62, at 10-68 (discussing employer's standard of
proof).
71 See Smallwood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614, 620 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 832 (1984); Marotta v. Usery, 629 F.2d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 1980); Day v. Mathews,
530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"6 See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1784 n.2 ("lt]his question has . . . left the Cir-
cuits in disarray"). Upon a finding of employment discrimination, section 706(g) of Title VII
authorizes the court to enjoin the employer from continuing the discriminatory practice and
permits the court to order the employer to hire or reinstate the employee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1982). However, Title VII prohibits the court from ordering the employer to hire, rein-
state, or award backpay to the employee if the adverse decision was made "for any reason
other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Id. In
addition, the court may order other appropriate affirmative action, and payment of reasona-
ble attorney's fees. Id. § 2000e-5(g), 5(k).
77 See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285-86; see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977) (if same decision would have
been reached absent discriminatory motive, "there would be no justification for judicial in-
terference with the challenged decision").
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have separated the issues of liability and relief" to prevent the
possibility that employers will escape liability despite intentional
discrimination. 79 Under this latter view, once the employee estab-
lishes some degree of discrimination, Title VII is deemed to have
been violated and liability attaches.80 Thus, the employee immedi-
ately would be entitled to various forms of preliminary relief re-
gardless of the causative force of the discriminatory factor.8 ' The
case would then proceed to the remedial stage, during which the
employer would be given an opportunity to limit its liability by
showing that it would have reached the same decision absent
discrimination. 2
The Supreme Court also rejected the McDonnell Douglas-
Burdine analytical framework when the employee introduced di-
rect evidence 3 of the employer's discriminatory motive.8 4 Many
lower courts have adhered to this pronouncement 5 and, in a
7' See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985) (en bane); see also Brodin,
supra note 3, at 323 ("same decision" test should be applied at remedial stage).
71 See Note, supra note 66, at 963-65; Comment, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A
Mixed Outcome for Title VII Mixed-Motive Plaintiffs, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 107, 141 (1989).
80 See Walsdorf v. Board of Comm'rs, 857 F.2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1988) (proof that
discriminatory motive was significant factor established Title VII violation); Bibbs, 778 F.2d
at 1323 ("[a] defendant's showing that the plaintiff would not have gotten the job anyway
... simply excludes the remedy of retroactive promotion or reinstatement"); Fadhl v. City
& County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984) ("proper for the district
court to find initial liability for employment discrimination without reference to whether the
[plaintiff] ultimately would have received employment"); see also Brodin, supra note 3, at
323-26 (discussing benefits of separating issues of relief and liability).
0' See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1323-24 (proof that discrimination "played some part" imme-
diately entitles employee to declaratory judgment, partial attorney's fees, or injunction).
Professor Brodin proposes that Title VII has been violated if the employee shows that dis-
crimination was a motive, even if the employer satisfies the "same decision" test. See
Brodin, supra note 3, at 323.
82 See Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1324 (employer will avoid remedies of promotion, reinstate-
ment, and backpay upon satisfaction of "same decision" test at remedial stage).
83 See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, § 185, at 543 ("[d]irect evidence is evidence
which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue"); W. WiLLS, supra note 28 (direct evidence is
"evidence which applies directly to the fact which forms the subject of inquiry"); Edwards,
supra note 26, at 13-17 (discussing direct versus indirect evidence).
84 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). In Thurston, an
employment discrimination case brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("ADEA"), the Court stated that "the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the
plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination." Id. But see Edwards, supra note 26, at
1-4, 32-35 (criticizing Thurston and proposing that McDonnell Douglas test be applied in
direct evidence cases).
8 See Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 935 (1st Cir. 1987) (if employee "proved by
direct evidence that sexual discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision ... the
court was correct in not following the McDonnell Douglas test"); Blalock v. Metals Trades,
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"Mount Healthy-type analysis," have held that "the ultimate issue
of discrimination has been proved" ' upon the employee's showing
that discrimination was a "significant"87 or "motivating" '88 factor in
the employer's decision.8" Therefore, any need for a presumption
of discrimination would be unnecessary.90 In addition, these courts
have determined that the employer bears the burden of persuad-
ing9' the court that it would have reached the same decision absent
discrimination. 2
III. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
A. Factual Summary
In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, a female senior manager
at Price Waterhouse, claimed she was denied a promotion to part-
ner because of her employer's reliance on sexual stereotypes. 3
When Ms. Hopkins' promotion was first proposed, she was the
Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 707 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[d]irect evidence and the McDonnell Douglas for-
mulation are simply different evidentiary paths by which to resolve the ultimate issue of
[the employer's] discriminatory intent"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989); Miles v.
M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 (11th Cir. 1985) ("McDonnell Douglas method of proving
an employment discrimination case ... pertains to situations where direct evidence of dis-
crimination is lacking") (citing Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1556 (lth
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984)); see also Note, supra note 55, at 885 n.116
(McDonnell Douglas does not apply in mixed-motive situation). It has been proposed that
courts focus "on the type of evidence the plaintiff presents, rather than the number of mo-
tives" to avoid "the doctrinal clutter that the 'mixed motive' label creates." Id. at 889.
88 Miles, 750 F.2d at 875 n.9 (quoting Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769,
774 (11th Cir. 1982)); Bell, 715 F.2d at 1557. Furthermore, many of these courts have held
that proof that an employer relied on a discriminatory factor is a violation of Title VII. See
id. at 1558 n.9; Lee, 684 F.2d at 774 (citing Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287).
" See Bell, 715 F.2d at 1558 n.9; Lee, 684 F.2d at 774.
88 See Fields, 817 F.2d at 935, 937.
8 The court's use of "significant" or "motivating" language is not necessarily distin-
guishable. See Fields, 817 F.2d at 937; Bell, 715 F.2d at 1558; Lee, 684 F.2d at 774.
80 See Thompkins v. Morris Brown College, 752 F.2d 558, 563 (11th Cir. 1985) ("cir-
cumstantial evidence is used to create an inference of discrimination under McDonnell-
Douglas, while no such inference is required in the case of direct evidence").
9' See Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875 (11th Cir. 1985) (when case of discrimi-
nation is proven by direct evidence, employer "bears a heavier burden"); Bell, 715 F.2d at
1558 ("under Mt. Healthy, and our cases applying Mt. Healthy in the Title VII context,
[the employer] bears ... [the] burden of persuasion").
8 See Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987); Blalock v. Metals Trades,
Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2062 (1989); Miles v. M.N.C.
Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (11th Cir. 1985); Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d
769, 774 (11th Cir. 1982).
" Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1781.
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only woman nominated out of a group of eighty-eight employees. 94
Upon initial review, Price Waterhouse's policy board did not make
a decision regarding Ms. Hopkins' candidacy and decided to recon-
sider her nomination the following year.9 5 Although viewed as a
"highly competent project leader," 6 the partners shared considera-
ble concern regarding Ms. Hopkins' interpersonal skills.9 7 The ad-
missions committee had received a number of negative comments
concerning her aggressiveness, impatience, and insensitivity. 8
However, many of these comments were based on Ms. Hopkins'
alleged failure to conform to certain sexual stereotypes. 99 Upon re-
consideration, the partners in Ms. Hopkins' office ultimately re-
fused to repropose her for partnership, prompting Ms. Hopkins to
bring suit under Title VII.1°0
B. Lower Court Decisions
After reviewing the facts, the District Court for the District of
Columbia found that Price Waterhouse's articulated reasons for re-
fusing to make Ms. Hopkins a partner were legitimate considera-
tions and not a pretext for intentional discrimination.101 However,
the court also found that the partners had unlawfully discrimi-
nated against Ms. Hopkins because "the firm's evaluation process
gave substantial weight" to partners' comments that stemmed
from sexual stereotyping.10 2 The court determined that Ms. Hop-
kins' proof that sexual discrimination played a role in the firm's
decision 0 3 effectively shifted the burden of persuasion to Price
Id.
" Id.
11 Id. at 1782 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112-13





100 Id. at 1778.
101 Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1114-15. The court determined that Price
Waterhouse was justified in deferring the decision of Ms. Hopkins' candidacy for partner-
ship for another year based upon Ms. Hopkins' conduct. Id. at 1114.
102 See id. at 1120. "One common form of stereotyping is that women engaged in asser-
tive behavior are judged more critically because aggressive conduct is viewed as a masculine
characteristic." Id. at 1118 (footnote omitted). In the present case, such discriminatory ster-
eotyping played a role in the evaluation process because comments tainted by sexual stereo-
types were given substantial weight in evaluating Ms. Hopkins' candidacy. Id. at 1120.
103 Id-
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Waterhouse to show by clear and convincing evidence that she
would have been denied partnership even in the absence of such
discrimination. 10 4 The court concluded that the firm failed to meet
its burden" 5 and that, even if it had, the firm would not have
avoided liability, but only equitable relief. 0
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia agreed that "the partnership selection process at Price
Waterhouse was impermissibly infected by stereotypical attitudes
towards female candidates,' 0 and affirmed the lower court's de-
termination of the proper allocation of proof. 08 The court, how-
ever, held that if Price Waterhouse had met its burden by clear
and convincing evidence, it also would effectively have avoided all
liability, rather than simply equitable relief. 09
C. The Supreme Court's Analysis
1. Plurality Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, a plurality of the
Supreme Court agreed that when an employee in a Title VII
mixed-motive action proves that gender played a part in an em-
ployment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer
to show that it would have made the same decision without consid-
10 Id. Once an employee shows that discrimination played a part in an employment
decision, "the [employee] is entitled to relief unless the employer has demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that the decision would have been the same absent discrimination."
Id.
105 Id. Although the court did not make a determination as to whether the legitimate or
the illegitimate consideration motivated the employer, it stated that as long as sexual dis-
crimination was present, "uncertainties must be resolved against the employer so that the
remedial purposes of Title VII will not be thwarted by saddling an individual subject to
discrimination with an impossible burden of proof." Id.
106 See id. at 1121. The court held that Ms. Hopkins was not entitled to an order that
she be made a partner or monetary relief subsequent to her resignation; however, she was
entitled to backpay dating from the time of denial of partnership to her resignation and
attorney fees. Id.
07 Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 468.
108 Id. at 471. On appeal, Price Waterhouse contended that Ms. Hopkins had not
demonstrated the exact impact that the stereotypical comments had on the firm's ultimate
decision to defer her candidacy. Id. at 465. The court of appeals, however, stated that ac-
ceptance of such a contention would "place an enormous, perhaps insurmountable, burden
on Title VII litigants who challenge the employment decisions of collegial bodies such as
partnerships." Id. at 469.
'0o See id. at 472. The court found that Ms. Hopkins had been constructively dis-
charged and, consequently, ordered the district court to award appropriate relief. Id.
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eration of gender.110 However, despite this finding, the Court re-
versed on the issue of the employer's requisite standard of proof,""
holding that the employer need not satisfy its burden by clear and
convincing evidence, but rather by a preponderance of the
evidence. 2
The Court further determined that Ms. Hopkins was required
to satisfy her initial burden by showing that the firm's reliance on
gender played a "motivating factor" in the disputed decision."' In
defining "motivating factor," the Court stated: "[I]f we asked the
employer at the moment of the decision what its reasons were and
if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would be
that the applicant or employee was a woman."1 4
The Court did not view its "burden shifting" rule as a depar-
ture from earlier disparate treatment cases, such as Burdine and
McDonnell Douglas,1 5 since the burden of persuasion on "whether
gender played a part in the employment decision" was not improp-
erly shifted to the employer." 6 This is because it is only after the
employee has satisfied her burden of persuasion that the burden
would shift to the employer."' The Court viewed its burden shift-
ing as an affirmative defense that would be addressed only after
the employee had established that gender played a sufficient role
in the employment decision. 8 The Court read Title VII as man-
dating that the employer's freedom of choice be preserved, so that
the employer could avoid liability if it successfully satisfied the
"same decision" test.19 The plurality rejected Ms. Hopkins' argu-
ment that, once she showed that gender played a motivating part
in the employment decision, she should be entitled to relief, with
the possibility that such relief could be mitigated by the em-
110 See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-88.
" Id. at 1795.
112 Id. at 1792, 1795.
1,3 Id. at 1787.
114 Id. at 1790.
111 Id. at 1788.
1 See id. The Court held that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion, so that
the issue was not one of "shifting burdens" as the Court addressed in Burdine. Id.
1'7 See id.
18 See id. In characterizing the shifting of burdens as an affirmative defense, the Court
was merely recognizing that the burden of persuasion would shift. See id. at 1809 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). As Justice Kennedy noted in a dissenting opinion, "describing the employer's
showing as an 'affirmative defense' ... is nothing more than a label." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
119 Id. at 1786.
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ployer's proof that it would nonetheless have reached the "same
decision" absent discrimination.12
The Court stated that Ms. Hopkins was not required to estab-
lish "the precise causal role played by legitimate and illegitimate
motivations in the employment decision she challenges." '121 The
Court reasoned that "[t]o construe the words 'because of' as collo-
quial shorthand for 'but-for causation['] . . . is to misunderstand
them." '122 According to Justice Brennan, a decision is arrived at
"because of' a discriminatory reason if the employer considered
the discriminatory factor in addition to legitimate factors at the
time the employer made the decision. 23 The Court believed this to
be true even if the employer later satisfies the "same decision"
test. 24
2. Concurring Opinions
In a concurring opinion, Justice White relied on the Court's
earlier decision in Mount Healthy. He stated that if the employee
showed discrimination was a substantial factor in the employment
decision,'25 the burden of persuasion would correctly shift to the
employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
same decision would have been made in the absence of discrimina-
tion. 28 However, Justice White added that there should be no re-
quirement the employer meet its burden through objective evi-
dence. 12 He argued that in a mixed-motive case it should be
sufficient to introduce credible testimony that the employer would
have acted the same way based on the legitimate reasons. 2 s
In a separate concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed with the
plurality that once an employee meets her burden, the burden of
persuasion should shift to the employer to satisfy the "same deci-
sion" test, where satisfaction would relieve the employer of liabil-
ity. '2 However, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's
120 See id. 1787 n.10.
121 Id. at 1786.
122 Id. at 1785.
123 Id.
124 Id.
121 See id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring).
121 Id. (White, J., concurring).
127 Id. at 1796 (White, J., concurring).
12 Id. (White, J., concurring).
129 See id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Title VII violated "when consideration of
an illegitimate criterion is the 'but for' cause of an adverse employment decision").
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distinction between the terms "because of sex" and "but for" cau-
sation, 130 believing that the plurality misread Title VII as "com-
manding" the burden shift to the employer if the decisional pro-
cess was at all "tainted" by discrimination.131 Instead, Justice
O'Connor asserted that, based on its legislative history, Title VII
demands "but for" causation since Congress intended to eliminate
discriminatory acts, not discriminatory thoughts.132 However, Jus-
tice O'Connor did not believe that the employee should bear the
burden of proving "but for" causation.13 3 In her view, the burden
should shift if the employee proves by direct evidence"3 that the
illegitimate factor was a "substantial factor in the particular em-
ployment decision such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an
inference that the decision was made 'because of' the plaintiff's
protected status."'135
Unlike the plurality, Justice O'Connor viewed this "burden
shifting" as a justified departure from McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine, 36 because the employer created uncertainty as to causa-
tion by knowingly giving weight to an impermissible criterion; the
employer, therefore, should suffer the consequences of its
conduct.'3
3. Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia, argued that the evidentiary framework es-
tablished in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, whereby the plain-
tiff bears the burden of persuasion throughout the trial, should be
applied in mixed-motive cases.' The dissent contended that both
the burden of production and the burden of persuasion should be
allocated to the employee because of "Congress' manifest concern
with preventing the imposition of liability in cases where discrimi-
:30 See id. at 1797, 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"3, Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the context of subjective employment
practices, "requiring the plaintiff to prove that any one factor was the definitive cause of the
decisionmaker's action may be tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to such deci-
sions." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
315 Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13I Id. at 1801 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137 See id. at 1803 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"I See id. at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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natory animus did not actually cause an adverse action."'139
IV. ANALYSIS
In recognizing that Price Waterhouse was not a "presump-
tion-based" case, as were McDonnell Douglas and Burdine,40 it
appears that the Court was correct in shifting the burden of per-
suasion to the defendant-employer, Price Waterhouse. In so doing,
the Court seemingly has resolved the conflict among the lower fed-
eral courts' as to the appropriate evidentiary scheme to be ap-
plied in Title VII mixed-motive cases.
In finding that a case is, in fact, a mixed-motive case, a court
logically has inferred that the employer used a discriminatory cri-
terion, at least in part, in reaching the challenged employment
decision. 4 2
Once it is determined that a mixed-motive case exists, the em-
ployee must prove that discrimination was a "motivating" factor in
the adverse employment decision. 43 Once a "motivating factor" is
established, intentional discrimination is thus proved, rendering
the creation of a presumption unnecessary.'" In effect, this scheme
relieves the employee of the lofty burden of establishing the pre-
cise causal role that discrimination played in the decision 45 since
requiring the employee to prove "but for" causation would be un-
duly burdensome and would make it virtually impossible for* a
mixed-motive employee to prevail.'14 This is especially true in sub-
jective employment decisions, such as existed in Price Waterhouse,
where the employee is often unable to produce the necessary
evidence.
However, since the Court failed to define precisely what it in-
139 Id. at 1811 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
"I See supra notes 33-54 and accompanying text (discussing evidentiary model in sin-
gle-motive cases).
141 See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text (discussing varying views by lower
courts).
142 See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring). As Justice
O'Connor stated, once the employee proves intentional discrimination, she also affirmatively
establishes conduct which Title VII seeks to deter. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"I See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (defining "motivating" factor).
144 Id.
145 See supra note 121 and accompanying text (plaintiff need not establish precise
causation).
141 See supra note 133 and accompanying text (Justice O'Connor, in her concurring
opinion argued that a plaintiff should not bear burden of proving "but for" causation).
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tended by a "motivating factor,"14 the lower courts likely will re-
main confused as to the standard of proof required from the em-
ployee before the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer.
Since no clear-cut standard was established by the Court, the ef-
fectiveness of Title VII in addressing employment discrimination
will depend largely upon the lower courts' interpretation of the
employee's initial burden of proof.
Although Justices O'Connor and White advocate the use of
"substantial," as opposed to "motivating" factor,'48 it is asserted
that the plurality and the two concurring opinions can be harmo-
nized. Justice O'Connor believed that the plurality mandated an
impermissibly low standard of causation. 149 However, both the plu-
rality and Justice O'Connor would require that some level of cau-
sation be established by the employee before the burden would
shift.150 Further, it is suggested that the employee should not be
required to establish her prima facie case by direct evidence; 51 cir-
cumstantial evidence should be sufficient as long as the court logi-
cally can conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated.
It is both logical and fair that an employer who has been
proven a "wrongdoer ... bear the risk that the influence of legal
and illegal motives cannot be separated.1 152 It is suggested that the
burden shift should occur when doubt as to causation exists, as it
does in a mixed-motive case. As a result, the employer's satisfac-
tion of its burden should not dispel the employee's proof as it does
in single-motive cases.1 53 It would appear that the Court in Price
Waterhouse was correct, therefore, in concluding that the burden
of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove that the impermissi-
ble factor was irrelevant in the ultimate result.
As suggested by the plurality, the employer should be required
to produce specific, objective evidence to satisfy its burden, since
the employer is in the best position to know what its job require-
'M' See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-90.
148 See supra notes 125 & 135 and accompanying text ("substantial" factor standard).
,41 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1804 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"I See id. at 1791. "Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevita-
bly prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision." Id. "The plaintiff
must show that the employer actually relied on her gender." Id. (emphasis added).
:01 See supra note 134 and accompanying text (direct evidence requirement).
112 Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (employer rebutted presumption of un-
lawful discrimination in single-motive situation).
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ments are.'54 Otherwise, the "burden shifting" would only have a
limited effect in eradicating employment discrimination. By plac-
ing such a burden on the employer, it is foreseeable that employers
will reevaluate their decision-making processes to limit and hope-
fully extinguish the use of even subtle discriminatory considera-
tions, such as sexual stereotyping. Thus, arguably, the Court's allo-
cation of the burden of proof promotes, to a greater extent, Title
VII's goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.
Noting that Title VII represents an effort on the part of Con-
gress to balance the rights of employees against the preservation of
employers' freedom of choice, the Court in Price Waterhouse de-
termined that the employer's ability to show that the same deci-
sion would have resulted regardless of the consideration of an ille-
gitimate factor, completely exculpates the employer from
liability.'55 Despite a clear violation of Title VII, the Price
Waterhouse Court would allow the employer to escape all Title
VII liability.5 6 This view can be criticized because without the im-
position of liability, it appears that merely labeling the employer a
violator serves no clear purpose. If the purpose of Title VII is to
eliminate employment discrimination, tolerating the influence of
discriminatory factors in employment decisions does little to
achieve that goal. It would be more in the spirit of Title VII to
apply the "same decision" test at the remedial, rather than liabil-
ity, stage of the analysis, whereby a court would be able to find a
violation of Title VII once the employee establishes that a discrim-
inatory factor played a motivating or, substantial role in the em-
ployer's decision. 57 Such a framework would advance effectively
the deterrent goals of Title VII 58 and, at the same time, avoid
placing an employee in a better position than if Title VII had
never been violated; damages would be limited by the degree of the
discriminatory infraction.
154 See Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791.
155 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (Title VII intended to protect employ-
ers' rights as well as employees').
158 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (some courts would completely absolve
employer).
'57 See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (discussing lower court decisions with
bifurcated analysis).
158 See Comment, supra note 79, at 141. "The Court would have more faithfully served
the purposes of Title VII had it adopted an approach that permitted a finding of liability




The Supreme Court's recognition of the shifting of the burden
of persuasion in mixed-motive cases is a very positive development
in Title VII law. In retreating from the requirement that the bur-
den of persuasion remain at all times upon the employee, the
Court in Price Waterhouse has eased the burden on employees in
combating discriminatory factors which have operated in the past
to prevent the advancement of women and minorities at the work-
place. It is hoped that this decision will incite employers to reex-
amine their existing personnel practices in order to abolish dis-
criminatory considerations, such as sexual stereotyping, and to
establish objective performance appraisal systems.
Despite such advances, however, the Price Waterhouse deci-
sion has left some unanswered questions. First, there is likely to be
"confusion and complexity"'159 among the lower courts due to the
absence of a precise standard of proof which must be met by the
employee. Furthermore, to effectively advance Title VII's goal of
equal employment for all, regardless of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, the Court should consider applying the "same deci-
sion" test at the remedial, not liability, stage of the analysis. Since
these issues were not directly addressed by the Court, it is up to
the lower courts to refine the standard set forth in Price
Waterhouse.
Tracey Gibbons Hanley
"' Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1810 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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